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Book Reviews:AMERICANPOLITICS

classificationswe learn that (1) the majorityof vetoes occur
over minorbills(56%);(2) vetoes of landmarkand important
legislationusuallyoccur in veto chains(65%);and (3) most
vetoes of minorlegislationare final (70%),that is, there are
no other bills or vetoes regardingthe matter.
The book is quitecomprehensivein its coverage,but there
is no mention of the line-itemveto. Every presidentsince
JimmyCarterhas askedfor the authorityto singleout items
for veto on spendingbills aftersigningthe other partsof the
bill. Congressgavethis powerto the presidentin 1996,but in
1998 the SupremeCourtruledit unconstitutionalin Clinton
v. Cityof New York.The issue is important,as 43 of the 50
governorshave line-itemveto power.
All studentsof the presidencyand Congressshould read
this book. The importanceof the findingsand the breadthof
the original data collected and interpretedalone make it
worth reading.This shouldbe requiredreadingin graduate
courses on the presidencyand on legislativebehavior.It is
also an excellent example of how to do rational choice
researchanddo it well. The book is probablynot appropriate
for most undergraduates,
especiallythosewho havenot been
exposedto formaltheory,althoughadvancedundergraduates
would benefitfrom the findingsin chapter2, based on data
from the post-WorldWar II era.
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that institutionsare importantbecausethey providestability,
shapechoicesets, andstructuredecisionmaking.Specifically,
"electoralrules and constituencyboundariesaffect policy
makers'behaviorsby determiningwhat sorts of voters they
must please if they are to remainin officeor rise to higher
office"(p. vii). Althoughthe researchis firmlyanchoredin
the new institutionalism,
there is also a stronglinkage,which
the authorsreadilyacknowledge,to the classicsin this field.
The effectsof institutionalfeatureson municipaleconomic
developmentactivities are examined from several angles.
First, the authorsexplorehow differencesin structuralfeatures, particularlythose of elected officials,are associated
with five separateeconomicdevelopmentpolicies and practices. Second,they ask whetherthe adoptionof comprehensive zoningis attributableto eithermarketfailureor distributive politics. Third, they turn to the question of how
institutionalstructuresshapedevelopment-based
constituency-relatedexperiencesof councilmembers.The conclusionis
that institutionalstructuresdo matterwith regardto these
varied economic development activities, but institutional
effectsare subtle.
Clingermayerand Feiock also examinethe decision-making effectsof turnoverin leadershipand councilmembership.
They propose two general explanationsfor the influenceof
turnoveron localpolicymaking.
The firstsuggeststhatprivate
organizationsinvolvedin negotiationswith a city that has a
high level of turnovermay be apprehensiveabout the city's
ability to fulfill long-term obligations, and this political
Institutional Constraints and Policy Choice: An Exploration
uncertaintydrives up the transactioncosts associatedwith
of Local Governance. By James C. Clingermayer and
The second explanationhingeson the attempt
negotiations.
RichardC. Feiock.Albany:State Universityof New York
elected officialsto avoidblame for potentiallycontroverby
Press,2001. 151p.$17.95paper.
sial decisionsor to concentratebenefitsto enhancepolitical
David R. Elkins,ClevelandState University prospects. Clingermayerand Feiock find support, albeit
for both explanationsbut alongan intriguingfaultline.
For more than twentyyears, urban scholarshave debated weak,findthat administrative
turnoveris inverselyassociated
They
whether economic determinismand its fiscal implications with the level of servicescontracted
out and that mayoral
trumpmunicipalpoliticalaction in local governmentpolicy turnoveris directlyassociatedwith contractingout. Also, in
choices. In a very real sense, the debate is about whether cities with
council-managerstructures,turnoverin council
local politics matters. Somewhat lost in this discussion,
is inverselyassociatedwithvariousmeasuresof
membership
although not entirely, is an issue that was once at the
debt.
municipal
forefront of urban scholarship:the role of institutional
Finally,the authorsexplorehowstateandfederaldecisions
structures.Withthe maturingtheoreticalinterestin the new
affect municipalpolicymaking.Their analysisof annexation
institutionalism,the time is ripe to revisit this area and
and exclusionaryzoningsuggeststhat state-levelattemptsto
determinewhetherinstitutionalstructuresmatter.According limit the
discretionaryauthorityof local officialshave largely
to JamesClingermayerand RichardFeiock, they do.
succeeded.They also find that the Tax ReformAct of 1986
in the subtitleis an apt description reducedthe level of
The term"exploration"
municipalrevenuebond debt.
of this work. Using seven separate data sets (three are
The book is not withoutflaws.The use of multipledatasets
derived from the authors' surveys conducted during the
and methodscreatesa trade-offbetweenbreadthof analysis
1980s, three from 1980 Census data, and one from the
and continuityof argument.The authorsremainfocusedon
InternationalCity ManagementAssociationfor 1988), the
the explorationof the institutionaldynamicsof municipal
authorsexploreissues as diverseas economicdevelopment policymaking,but the book seems to lack the unifiedtheme
decisionmaking,municipalpracticesassociatedwith zoning, typical of researchbased on fewer data sources. In some
citizen-initiatedcontacts and caseworkactivitiesof council instancesit seems this is a collectionof discretearticles,with
members,contractingout for services, and debt financing little connectionbetweenone chapteror sectionandanother.
decisions.In addition,they explorehow externalconstraints The book would have benefited from an appendixwith
associatedwith annexationpolicy,exclusionaryzoningprac- details about the various data sets, the constructionof
tices, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986 affect municipal variables,and some of the statisticalproblems associated
with the analyses.For instance, regardingcitizen-initiated
policymaking.The breadthof the empiricalanalysismakesa
convincingcase thaturbanscholarsshouldseriouslyconsider contacts, Clingermayerand Feiock note that "usable rethe role urbaninstitutionalstructureshave in shapinglocal
sponses were receivedfrom 234 council members"(p. 39),
but the statisticalanalysisrefersto an N of 177 (p. 41). Why
policydecisions.Indeed,Clingermayerand Feiockhope that
theirworkwill reenergizeresearchin this area.
were so manycases dropped?AlthoughI am inclinedto find
The authors define institutionalismas the "formaland
brevitya virtue, furtherdevelopmentof some ideas would
informalrules operatingwithinor acrossorganizations"(p.
have been helpful. For instance, the discussion of time
horizonsis intriguingand warrantselaboration.
2). In their analysisof municipalgovernments,they place
These criticismsshould not dissuadeurbanscholarsfrom
greatemphasison the formalrulesof institutions.It is argued
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readingthis worthwhilecontribution.It undoubtedlywill be
cited amongthe classicsin the institutional-structural
explanationsof municipalpolicymaking.Indeed, drawingon this
earlier generationof scholarship,Clingermayerand Feiock
concludethat institutionsmatterbut in ways that "mediate
and interactwith other factors"to influenceoutcomes (p.
123). Whether Clingermayerand Feiock accomplishtheir
goal of reinvigoratingthe institutionalperspectivein urban
scholarshipremains to be seen, but their explorationis a
criticalfirststep.
Empireon the Hudson:EntrepreneurialVisionand Political
Powerat the Port of NewYorkAuthority.By JamesonW.
Doig. New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 2001. 620p.
$49.50.
Steven P. Erie, University
of California,San Diego
on
the
Hudson
is
a
dual
Empire
biographyof the Portof New
YorkAuthority,America'sfirstsemiautonomous,self-financing public developmentagency, which helped inspire the
Tennessee Valley Authority, and of the individualswho
shaped it. It is also much more. This case study of local
government'scatalyticrole in regional economic development is a majorcontributionto the twentieth-century
history
of the New York metropolitanregion. In an era when
bureaucracyhas becomesynonymouswithfailedgovernment
programs,the Port Authorityis a valuablereminderof the
positivecontributionsthat publicagenciescan make. It also
servesas a useful prismthroughwhichthe authorviews and
critiquesrelevanttheoriesof politicalleadership.
Doig shows that the Port of New York Authority,chartered in 1921by the statesof New Yorkand New Jersey,was
a latter-daychild of the Progressivereform impulseof the
earlytwentiethcentury,whichsoughtrationalplanningby an
activistgovernment,purgedof corruptionand infusedwith
"business-like"efficiency.The initial impetuswas the fear
that the region'smagnificentwaterfrontmight lose its preeminent status to other East Coast ports because of the
additionaltime and costs entailed by dockingfacilities locatedmostlyin New Yorkbut railterminalslocatedmostlyin
New Jersey.
The newlycreatedauthoritydid, indeed, have a life of its
own. Fromthe 1920sthroughthe 1950s,it evolvedfrom the
relativelynarrowmissionof rail-freightplanningto a much
broadermandateto build and operate bridgesand tunnels,
assume the dominant role in regional air transport (at
Newark,LaGuardia,and Kennedy),and constructa containerizedmarineterminal,a giganticmid-Manhattan
bus terminal, and a new arterialhighwaysystem.
The financialunderpinningsof this "imperial"bureaucracy
were the bridgeand toll revenuesthat allowedthe authority
to self-financemost of its capitalprojectsby issuingrevenue
bondsratherthandependon local and stategovernmentsfor
fashion, it successfunding. In classic survival-of-the-fittest
fully foughtoff challengesfromboth withinand withoutthe
region. New York MayorJohn F. Hylanin the 1920smobilized TammanyHall againstthe Port Authority,but he was
forced into retirementby the authority'sgood friend, Governor Al Smith.Robert Moses, the region'swell-connected
transportation"powerbroker,"tried unsuccessfullyto block
the authority'snew airportmanagementrole as well as its
Manhattanbus terminal,but he later cooperatedwith the
authority on bridge and highway improvements.Earlier,
there was a serious challenge from Washingtonwhen the
New Deal attemptedto end the tax-exemptstatusof munic-
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ipal bonds. This was defeated by a nationwide,ostensibly
"grassroots"
campaignskillfullyorchestratedfromthe offices
of the Port Authority.
Doig quotes RalphWaldoEmerson'saphorismthat institutionsare "the lengthenedshadowof one man"but credits
threeindividuals.JuliusHenryCohen,the authority'sgeneral
counselfrom 1921until 1942,firstemergedinto prominence
as a garmentindustrylawyerwho promotedthe Brandeisian
causeof commercialarbitrationof labordisputes.He carried
his cooperativeprinciplesinto the publicsector and crystallized the idea of bi-statepartnershipembodiedin the 1921
Port Compact.Swiss-bornOthmarH. Ammann,the authority'schief engineerfrom 1928to 1939,lobbiedfor, designed,
and supervisedthe constructionof the George Washington
Bridgeand the LincolnTunnel.He returnedin the 1950sto
design the second deck of that bridge as well as the new
ThrogsNeck Bridgeand the Verrazano-Narrow
spans.The
thirdcreativebureaucratwas AustinJ. Tobin,the authority's
assistantattorneyand then its executivedirector.A graduate
of Holy Cross College who lost his interest in theology,he
committedhimselfto the authorityas a crusade.He ran the
campaignthatdefeatedthe aforementionedNew Deal policy
in the 1930s and then field marshaledthe authority'snew
initiativesin the 1940s and 1950s as airportmanager,bus
terminaloperator,and highwayengineer.
The authorimpartiallydocumentsnot only the authority's
successes but also its failures and periods of drift and
retrenchment.In the 1920s, the authoritywas fought to a
standstillby the dozenrailroadsthat servedthe metropolitan
region and had no interestin centralizingtheir competitive
operations.Declining revenuesduringthe Depression and
the early years of WorldWar II coincidedwith the ascendancyof FrankC. Fergusonas Port Authoritychairman.A
conservativeinvestmentbanker,he focusedhis tunnel-vision
on balance-sheetconsiderations.Tobin'scareerfromthe late
1950s to his abrupt retirement in 1971 (after alienating
governorsof both states) was a mixedbag. His successesin
constructingnewbridgesandhighwayswerecounterbalanced
by a financiallydisastrousmass transitexperiment,the billion-dollargrandiosityof the World Trade Center project,
and the defeatof a proposedjetportin northernNew Jersey.
Doig's concludingchaptercoversin less detail the embattled post-Tobin era. Since the 1970s, the authority has
alternatedbetween "malaise"or retrenchmentand controversial new initiatives that the author views as disguised
attempts to divert its revenues into nontransportation
projectsrun by local and state politicians.Critics,including
New York Mayor Rudolph Guiliani, want to scrap the
authority,but Doig hopes for a rebirthof creativeleadership
in the twenty-firstcentury.
This gracefullywrittenbook is a significantcontributionto
the literature.Doig offers a useful corrective to Robert
Caro's(ThePowerBroker,1974)understandableoveremphasis of the omnipotenceof his protagonist,Robert Moses.
Doig also providesa sensiblecritiqueof James Q. Wilson's
viewthatpublicbureaucraciesinvariablyarepassiveresponders, of necessitydrivenby externalforces,ratherthanproactive moversof events,motivatedby creativityand innovation
emanatingfrom within. Finally,Doig gives deservedattention to the ethicaldimensionof publicleadership,specifically
the need to balanceorganizationalefficiencywithdemocratic
accountability.In so doing,Empireon the Hudsonjoins the
front rankof scholarshipon publicenterpriseand enterprising publicentrepreneurs.
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